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A QUESTION OF INTENT: THE MASSACHUSETTS
ABUSE PROTECTION ORDER AND THE
INNOCENT DOER OF HARM
Courts can never abandon insistence upon the evil intent as a prerequisite to criminality,partly because the real menace to social interests
is the intentional,not the innocent, doer of harm.'

I. INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts Abuse Prevention Order (209A) does not distinguish an individual who intentionally violates a restraining order from
one who accidentally violates a 209A order.2 A 209A order does not
speak specifically to the defendant's state of mind; it is silent concerning
the mens rea required to violate a 209A order.3 The violation of a 209A
order is a strict liability offense that only requires a defendant to have prior
knowledge of the existence of a 209A order.4 Theorists argue that some
Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 68 (1933).
2

See generally MASS.

GEN. LAWS.

ch. 209A, § 7 (West 1992) (civil remedy that

provides protective order to ensure safety of abused victims and protect them from further
abuse). Many criminal offenses are defined in terms of intent, that is, "the prosecution
must prove that the defendant intentionally committed the social harm that constitutes the

actus reus of the offense."

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW

105 (1995).

A person intentionally causes the social harm of an offense if he desires to cause the social
harm, or he acts with knowledge that the social harm will occur as a result of his conduct.
Mill v. State, 585 P.2d 546, 549 (Alaska 1978).
3 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 7 (1992); Dressier, supra note 2 (analyzing the
term mens rea). Mens rea is defined as "a general immorality of motive, vicious will, or an
evil-meaning mind." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952). The term mens
rea suggests a general notion of moral blameworthiness, i.e., that the defendant committed
the actus reus of an offense with a morally blameworthy state of mind. Commonwealth v.
Buckley, 354 Mass. 508, 510, 238 N.E.2d 335, 337 (1968). Mens rea may also be defined,
as "the particular mental state provided for in the definition of an offense." Dressier, supra
note 2, at 103.
4 See Commonwealth v. Crimmins, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 490, 707 N.E.2d 832,
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mens rea should apply to the elements of the strict liability offense, especially if it permits the imposition of a severe penalty such as
incarceration. 5
Without the additional requirement of mens rea, according to a
209A order, even if a plaintiff initiates contact with a defendant, such as
going to his home, the defendant is still liable.6 A defendant would also be
guilty of a violation if he entered the subway on his way home from work
and the plaintiff was sitting inside.7 Although the defendant did not intend
to cause any social harm in the above circumstance, he is nevertheless
guilty of violating a 209A restraining order. 8 He is guilty without the court
even looking into his state of mind, or the mitigating circumstances surrounding the encounter. 9
This note argues that the substantial penalty imposed for a violation
of a 209A restraining order should remove the statute from the realm of a
public welfare offense, requiring the Commonwealth to show that the defendant intended to violate the order before finding the defendant guilty of
a 209A violation. Part II of this note traces the history and development of
the 209A order in Massachusetts. The third part analyzes the 209A restraining order as a strict liability crime and considers its constitutionality.
Finally, part IV concludes by suggesting a 209A order should include language requiring that, to be found guilty, a defendant must intend to violate
the order.
833 (1999) (acknowledging Commonwealth must prove defendant had knowledge of order); Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 591, 682 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1997) (hold-

ing violation requires no more knowledge than defendant knew of order). A showing that
the court served a defendant with a copy of court order is strong evidence that a defendant
had knowledge. Bongiovi v. LaBeet, 155 A.D.2d 320, 321 (New York 1989). The failure

of such service is not fatal where the defendant had actual knowledge of the terms of the
order. Id.
5 See 4 BI. Comm. *21 (advocating "vicious will" necessary to constitute crime). But
see Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1958) (stating "vicious will" not always
necessary to constitute crime). The Lambert decision suggests conduct alone, without
regard to intent of doer, is often sufficient to constitute a crime. Id.
6 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 7.
7 See generally id.
8 See generally Dressier, supra note 2, at 95 (explaining some scholars state social

harm is essential element of every crime). Social harm may be defined as the "negation,
endangering, or destruction of an individual, group, or state interest which was deemed
socially valuable." Albin Eser, The Principleof "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 413

(1965).
9 See Commonwealth v. Collier 427 Mass. 385, 389, 693 N.E.2d 673, 676 (1998)
(noting statute requires no more knowledge than that defendant knew of order).
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II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 209A ORDER
Chapter 209A provides a statutory mechanism by which victims
can enlist the aid of the Commonwealth in prosecuting restraining order
violations.' 0 A 209A order provides for the issuance of protective orders
to ensure the safety and security of "abused"" victims and to protect them
from future incidents of abuse. 12 A person suffering from abuse may file a
complaint in the court requesting protection from such abuse. 13 In deciding whether to issue an abuse prevention order, the judge must focus on
whether serious physical harm is imminent. 14 The court may then issue an

'0

See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 1 (1992); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407

Mass. 340, 344, 553 N.E.2d 915, 916 (1990) (supporting proposition victim may enlist help
of Commonwealth).

I See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A § 1 (1992). Chapter 209A § I defines abuse as:
"the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or household members: (a) attempting to cause or causing physical harm; (b) placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm; (c) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations
by force, threat or duress." id.
12 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, §§ 1-7 (1992); Esther M. Bixler, The Legal Effects of the MassachusettsAbuse PreventionAct, the Stalking Statute, and the Marital Rape
Exemption on Victims of Domestic Abuse, 2 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 79, 82
(1997) (stating statute protects victims from future incidents of abuse); John P. Zanini,
Overview of Mass. Gen. L ch. 209A, The Abuse Prevention Statute, and the Prosecutorial
Role of the DistrictAttorney's Office, 28 New Eng. L. Rev. 261, 261 (1993) (stating statute
ensures safety of adults and minor children).
13See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 3. The victim may request the court to issue
orders which:
(a) order the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff, (b) order the
defendant to vacate forthwith the household, (c) award the plaintiff ...
temporary custody of a minor child, (d) order the defendant to pay temporary support for the plaintiff or any child in the plaintiff's custody or both,
(e) order the defendant to pay to the person abused monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of ...abuse, and (f) order the
plaintiffs address to be impounded.
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 3 (a) - (f).
See also Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. at 344, 553 N.E.2d at 917-18 (highlighting typical evidence supporting finding defendant placed spouse in fear of imminent
physical harm).
14See Larkin v. Ayer Div. of Dist. Court Dept. 425 Mass. 1020, 1020, 681 N.E.2d
817, 818 (1997) (sending complainant notices of future court proceedings did not constitute
serious imminent harm); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638, 700 N.E.2d
296, 298 (1998) (holding nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled does not rise to fear of
imminent serious physical harm).
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order for a period of time not to exceed one year.' 5 The complainant may
move for an extension when the prior order expires, which the court may
grant if it is needed to protect the complainant from further abuse.' 6 Once
the complainant has secured a 209A order, a defendant must either abide
by its terms, or be prosecuted. 7
The Commonwealth must prove four elements in order to convict a
defendant of violating a 209A order. 18 First, that the court issued a 209A
ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing the alleged victim, to vacate
and remain away from the household or workplace, and to refrain from
contacting the alleged victim. 19Second, that the order was in effect on the
date of the alleged violation. 20 Third, that the defendant knew that the
restraining order was in effect. 2' And fourth, that the defendant violated
the order.22
Even though a 209A order is a civil remedy, if an individual violates the order it is a criminal offense and that individual is subject to incarceration. 23 The statute provides a harsh penalty for violations of restraining orders. 24 A violation of a 209A order is "punishable by a fine of
not more than five thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than
two and one-half
years in house of correction or both such fine and im25
prisonment.'

15See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch.

209A,

§ 3.

16See id.
17See id.
18See

Massachusetts Model Jury Instruction For Use in the District Courts, Instruction 5.61, Violation of an Abuse Prevention Order Under G.L. c. 209A (providing typical
jury instruction for violating 209A order). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass.
587, 595, 682 N.E.2d 611, 617 (1997) (summarizing typical jury instruction for violation of
c. 209A order).
19See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
20
Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.

See MASS.

GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 7 (1992). Chapter 209A provides, in pertinent
part: "each order issued shall contain the following statement: VIOLATION OF THIS
ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE." Id.
24
See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 7.
25 See id.
23
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III. ANALYSIS

A. The 209A Order as a Strict Liability Offense
A 209A order is silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation; it does not speak specifically to the defendant's state of mind. 26 A
209A order only requires that the defendant have actual or constructive
knowledge of the order and its terms and conditions.27 A jury may vote to
convict based solely on the fact a defendant violated the order, regardless
of whether or not he intended to violate the order.28 In other words, the
violation of a 209A order is a strict liability offense.2 9
Strict liability crimes do not contain a mens rea requirement for
one or more elements of the actus reus.30 Thus, the defendant's culpability
is irrelevant in strict liability crimes. 3' Courts consider various factors in
determining whether a statute that appears on its face to be one of strict
liability should be treated as such.32 One of the various factors that may
26 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch 209A,

§ 7.
27 See Commonwealth v. Crimmins, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 490, 707 N.E.2d 832,
833 (1999) (asserting conviction requires defendant had actual or constructive knowledge);
Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 591, 682 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1997) (holding
violation requires no more knowledge than defendant knew of order). A showing that the
court served a defendant with a copy of court order is strong evidence that a defendant had
knowledge. Bongiovi v. LaBeet, 155 A.D.2d 320, 321 (N.Y. 1989). The failure of such
service is not fatal where the defendant had actual knowledge of the terms of the order. id.
28 See Delaney, 425 Mass. at 595, 682 N.E.2d at 617 (holding intent not essential
element to prove violation of 209A order).
29 See Dressier, supra note 2 at 125 (defining strict liability crimes as not containing
mens rea requirement). In a strict liability offense, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant committed the actus reus, but does not have to prove any mens rea in regard to
the actus reus. Id.
30See id.
31 See id.

32 See Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960). Judge Blackmun set out various factors that may overcome the presumption of strict liability:
(1) that the statutory crime is not derived from the common law; (2) that
there is an evident legislative policy that would be would be undermined
by a mens rea requirement; (3) that the standard imposed by the statute is
"reasonable and adherence thereto properly expected of a person"; (4) that
the penalty is small; and (5) that the "conviction does not gravely besmirch."
Dressier, supra note 2, at 126 (quoting Holdridge v. United States, 282
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overcome the presumption against strict liability is that the penalty is
small. 33 Unlike other typical strict liability offenses, the penalty for violating a 209A order is not small, but rather quite severe. 34
The mens rea requirement for a crime is firmly embedded in criminal law. 35 The common law rule requiring mens rea is "followed in regard
to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms
include it."' 36 The Supreme Court warns that offenses that do not contain a
mens rea element have a generally disfavored status. 37 A statute that dispenses with mens rea may criminalize innocent conduct. 38 Unlike the Supreme Court, Massachusetts courts have tended to concentrate more upon
the defendant's
conduct than upon the issue of his specific intent to com39
mit a crime.
F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960)).
33 See supra note 32 (stating various factors that may overcome strict liability offenses).
34See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 1992) (providing violation is criminal
offense and subject to fine, incarceration, or both).
35See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (emphasizing existence of
mens rea rule of criminal jurisprudence); Commonwealth v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)
(explaining courts have read mens rea requirement into statute, even if not included in
language). Justice Jackson observed in Morrisette:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted
by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar
exculpatory, "But, I didn't mean to," and has afforded a rational basis for a
tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of
retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952).
36 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52.
37See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1979) (attesting to strict liability offenses generally disfavored status).
38 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 419 (1985) (interpreting federal stat-

ute to dispense with mens rea would criminalize innocent conduct).
39See Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 68
(1933) (noting court should look at defendant's state of mind). The article emphasizes:
All criminal law is a compromise between two fundamentally conflicting
interests, -that of the public which demands restraint of all who injure or
menace the social well-being and that of the individual which demands
maximum liberty and freedom from interference. The history of criminal
law shows a constant swinging of the pendulum so as to favor now the
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B. Limitations of Strict Liability Offenses

Despite the Supreme Court's affirmation of the constitutionality of
strict liability offenses, the Court has suggested that such offenses are limited by the Constitution. 4° The Court recognized the existence of certain
strict liability offenses where some mens rea must attach to the statute in
order to criminalize the violations. 4' Massachusetts courts have held that
when prosecuting under 209A, the Commonwealth is not required to show
the defendant intended to violate the order.42 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, however, has read a mens rea requirement into 209A in
rare circumstances, such as when a third party has been involved in the act
that results in the violation.43 In such situations, the Commonwealth is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant intended to
violate the order. 44
Massachusetts courts should consider the law of criminal contempt
when analyzing whether a 209A order should include an element of intent
on the part of the defendant to engage in conduct that violates the order.45
The law of criminal contempt, relating to the elements the Commonwealth
needs to prove to obtain a conviction, is not so different from that of violating a restraining order. 46 The Commonwealth must prove that "there
one, now the other, of these opposing interests. Id.
40See Dressier, supra note 2, at 129-30 (summarizing mens rea not constitutional requirement).
41See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 147 (1959) (holding punishment based on
strict liability with regard to conduct of First Amendment is unconstitutional). See generally Alan C. Michaels, ConstitutionalInnocence, 112 HARV. L. REv. 828 (providing overview of cases recognizing some form of culpability attaching to strict liability offenses).
42 See Commonwealth v. Collier, 427 Mass. 385, 389, 693 N.E.2d 673, 676 (1998)

(reaffirming principle Commonwealth not required to show that defendant intended to
violate order).
43 See id. (holding that Commonwealth is required to prove intentional act). Even
though this case involved a third party in an act that resulted in the violation of the protective order, the Commonwealth was required to prove an intentional act by the defendant
under MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 7. Id.
44See id.
45See Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 595, 682 N.E.2d 611, 617 (1997).
The defendant urged the court to look into the law of contempt and conclude that an essential element of the crime of violating a 209A order is a finding that the defendant intended
to violate the order. Id., 682 N.E.2d at 617. Compare Commonwealth v. Brogan, 415 Mass.
169, 171, 612 N.E.2d 656 (1993) (quoting Furtado v. Furtado, 380 Mass. 137, 145, 402
N.E.2d 1024 (1980)) (holding intent element of crime of criminal contempt); with Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. at 595, 682 N.E.2d at 617 (1997).
46See supra note 45 and accompanying text (summarizing elements of prosecuting
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was a clear, outstanding order of the court, that the defendant knew of the
order, and that the defendant clearly and intentionally disobeyed that order
in circumstances in which he was able to obey it," to prove a defendant
guilty of criminal contempt. 47 The mens rea requirement is consistent
with the principle that one who does not choose to cause social harm, does
not deserve to be punished.48
Even though a 209A order is silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation, silence on this point does not necessarily suggest
that the legislature intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element.49 In the absence of specific words of mens rea, it is not supposed
50
"that the legislature intended to make accidents and mistake crimes."
This is especially true where the violation calls for a severe penalty, such
as two and one-half years of imprisonment.5' In such a case, there should
be additional mens rea requirements added into the statute because the
courts traditionally required some element of knowledge or intent before
they could impose punishment. 52 A mens rea requirement under a criminal statute is a question of law that the court may determine, even if the
statute dispenses with a mental state. 53 Just as with a contempt order, a
209A order violation). But see supra note 18 and accompanying text (listing elements of
criminal contempt case).
47 See Brogan, 415 Mass. at 171, 402 N.E.2d at 1024.
48 See Dressier. supra note 2, at 127.
49 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994) (holding silence does not
necessarily suggest Congress dispensed with mens rea); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
250, 250 (1922) (stating mens rea necessary element in every crime). But see Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (stating there is latitude in lawmakers to exclude
elements of knowledge from its definition).
50 See Kansas v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 393 (1888); see also Commonwealth v.
Wallace, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 364, 439 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1982) (noting it is not supposed legislature intended to make accidents and mistake crimes).
51 See I W. LAFAVE & A.W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(e)
(1986) (emphasizing courts traditionally require some element of mens rea where there
exists severe penalty).
52 See Collier, 427 Mass. at 389, 693 N.E.2d at 676. The court in Collier reasoned,
"where the definition of a crime requires some forbidden act by the defendant, his bodily
movement, to qualify as an act, must be voluntary." Id. To some extent, then, all crimes of
affirmative action require something in the way of the mental element-- at least an intention
to make the bodily movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires. Id.;
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 364, 439 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1982) (reiterating some mens rea was required before punishment could be imposed).
53 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 611 (1994) (addressing fact of mens
rea requirement under criminal statute is question of law); United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (holding courts, through interpretation of statute, define the mens
rea required for conviction).
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209A order should contain language requiring that, in order to be convicted, a defendant must clearly and intentionally violate the order.54
C. ConstitutionalQuestion of the 209A Restraining Order as a Strict
Liability Crime
The legislature is entrusted with defining the elements of a criminal
offense. 5 The Massachusetts legislature did not include any mens rea for
209A violations with respect to any element of the crime, but "certainly far
more than the simple omission of the appropriate phase from the statutory
56
definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement.
The failure of the statute to require a showing of intentional violation before liability may be imposed may be found unconstitutional, but only in
certain situations.57
For instance, the Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court have mandated minimum mental states for strict liability
crimes to preserve interests protected under the First Amendment. 58 Academics have also argued that the Constitution places restrictions on strict
liability in the criminal law. 59 Some theorists have argued that strict liability should be unconstitutional and that some mens rea should apply to
the elements of the offense.60 Others have argued that "strict liability is

54

See Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 115, 118, 668 N.E.2d 861, 863

(1996) (addressing issue of contempt). The court looked to the law of contempt and concluded that an essential element of the crime of violating a 209A order is finding that the

defendant intended to violate the order. I.
55 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) (indi-

cating legislature defines elements of criminal offense).
56 Id. at 436-37 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
57 Id. at 436-37.
58 See Lambert v. California. 355 U.S. 225, 225-28 (holding due process clause may
require knowledge in range of situations not limited to those which have First Amendment
aspects); Commonwealth v. Buckley, 354 Mass. 508, 510, 238 N.E.2d 335, 337 (1968)
(discussing statutes preserving interests protected under First Amendment). Statutes that

may "impinge upon the public's access to constitutionally protected material" have been
construed to require mens rea. Demetropolos v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 658, 661, 175
N.E.2d 259 (1961).
59 See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828,
829
(1999) (concluding Supreme Court should recognize constitutional limitations on strict

liability crimes).
60 See id at 833 (arguing for constitutional requirement of mens rea in strict liability
crimes).
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6
unconstitutional for any offense punishable by imprisonment.", '
According to the principle of "constitutional innocence," strict liability crimes are unconstitutional when the innocent conduct, by itself,
could not be a crime.62 Constitutional innocence is consistent with a
minimum culpability for every element of an offense. 63 Although an offense may impose strict liability, such offenses generally do not apply
strict liability to every element. 64 Crimes described as imposing strict liability under the element analysis approach are not strict liability crimes at
all, because the offenses require some morally blameworthy state of
mind. 65 "A law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy
in the average member of the community would be too severe for that
community to bear." 66
A 209A order permits the imposition of a severe penalty for violations; as much as two and one half years in prison.67 This should not be
regarded a minor offense and should require clear legislative language to
dispense with mens rea.68 Any other interpretation might raise serious
constitutional doubts. 69 The Model Penal Code provides the general rule
that no criminal conviction may be obtained unless the prosecution proves
some form of culpability regarding each material element of an offense.70
The penalty for a strict liability offense should not be imprison7
ment. ' The penalty for a 209A violation is severe because it includes a
61

See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephen III, Defenses, Presumptions, and

Burden of Proofin the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1376 (1979).
62 See Michaels, supra note 41, at 836 (proposing answer to question, if some conduct is too innocent to be punished, what principle underlies that judgment, and how can it
be grounded in the Constitution).
63 See id. at 836. The actor may not be punished if she is as careful as possible. Id.
However, the legislature defines the terms "as careful as possible." Id.
64Id. at 840 (examining strict liability from offense analysis perspective).
65See Michaels, supra note 41, at 839.
66Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes).
67 See generallyMASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 7.
68

See The American Law Institute Model Penal Code Official Draft § 2.02(1)

(1962).
69 See
70

id.

See The American Law Institute Model Penal Code Official Draft § 2.02(1)

(1962). Section 2.02(1) considers the minimum requirements of culpability and provides, "a
person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense." Id.
71 See Sayre, supra note 1, at 72 (commenting subjecting defendants, who lack mens
rea, to incarceration is "revolting to the community sense of justice"); The American Law
Institute Model Penal Code And Commentaries § 2.05, note 1 (1962) (attacking strict li-
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term of incarceration without litigating culpability.7 2 If the offense is
punishable by imprisonment, the defendant's personal interest weighs too
heavily against allowing conviction without any proof of mens rea, such as
intent.73

The penalty for violating a restraining order is severe and does not
complement the small penalties typically attached to strict liability offenses.74 Considering the severity of the penalty imposed is one way to
distinguish strict liability offenses from other non-public-welfare offenses,
that permit conviction.75 Commentators argue that offenses punishable by
imprisonment must require mens rea.76 A severe penalty tends to suggest
that the legislature did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement,
even though the statute is silent pertaining to mens rea.77
IV. CONCLUSION
Chapter 209A should require that, to be convicted, a defendant
must clearly and intentionally violate the restraining order. It should speak
specifically to the defendant's state of mind. The legislature should add
ability offenses whenever offense carries possibility of criminal conviction).
72 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 7.
73 See The American Law Institute Model Penal Code And Commentaries § 2.05,

Comment 1 (1962). Comment I further explains that:
Crime does and should mean condemnation and no court should have to
pass that judgment unless it can declare that the defendant's act was culpable. This is too fundamental to be compromised. The law goes far
enough if it permits the imposition of a monetary penalty in cases where
strict liability has been imposed. Id.
74 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616-17 (1994) (commenting small
penalties attached to such offenses complimented absence of mens rea); Morissette v.
United States 342 U.S. 246, 256 (cautioning "penalties commonly are relatively small" for
strict liability offenses); see also Sayre, supra note, at 70 (imposing severe punishments for
offenses require no mens rea would seem incongruous).
75 See Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102, 1103 (2000); see also Morissette,
342 U.S. at 256 (stating penalties of public welfare offenses are relatively small); Sayre
supra note 1, at 72 (stating penalty of public welfare offenses should not be severe).
76 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 617 (arguing offenses punished by imprisonment must require mens rea); see also Sayre, supra note i, at 72 (quoting "Crimes punishable with
prison sentences ordinarily require proof of a guilty mind").
77 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 618 (asserting severe penalty, such as imprisonment, is
further factor tending to suggest Congress did not intend to eliminate mens rea requirement). See 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (West 1999). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3559 makes any crime punishable by more than one year in prison a felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (West 1999).

90
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mens rea requirements to the statute that require some element of intent in
order for the Commonwealth to obtain a conviction. Alternatively, a judge
could charge the jury with an intent instruction, even though nothing in the
language of the statute suggests that the defendant must have intended to
violate the order. A defendant who does not intend to cause any social
harm does not deserve to be punished.
Kostantinos Sofronas

